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Introduction 
 
The Labour Government has put the creation of a ‘work-based Welfare State’ at the heart of its 
strategy for modernising Britain. The key changes have involved the introduction and rapid 
extension of a variety of mandatory and voluntary New Deal job search, training and 
employment programmes; tax and benefit reform to ‘make work pay’; and the ‘activation’ of 
the benefit system, where lone parents, carers and people receiving disability benefits, can now 
be required to attend work related interviews and assessments. The objectives of this 
transformation are both economic and cultural. One aim is to increase the sustainable level of 
employment by getting more benefit claimants into work. The other is to change the culture of 
the benefits system “towards independence and work rather than payments and dependence” 
(HMSO, 1999, Chapter 4). 
 
The 'welfare to work' strategy involves more than the abstract creation of opportunities and 
incentives. The Government has coupled policy change with radical organisational reform. 
Most significantly, it has announced the creation of a new agency, “with a clear focus on 
work”, which will bring together the Employment Service (ES) and those parts of the Benefits 
Agency which support people of working age (Local Authorities are expected to continue to 
administer Housing Benefit). The new service will learn from the existing ‘One’ pilots and 
“deliver a single, integrated service to all working age benefit claimants and employers”. After 
bringing together central functions the new front end delivery of services will be gradually 
rolled out across the country, commencing in 2001. According to the Prime Minister the new 
agency will be in the “front line of the drive to modernise Government” and will “continue to 
develop the partnership approach to working with local authorities and the private and 
voluntary sectors which the Government has adopted in implementing its welfare to work 
policies” (Hansard, 16 March 2000, col. 257W).1  
 
The ‘senior partner’ in this new agency will be the ES which  has successfully ‘reinvented’ 
itself following the 1997 General Election. After being given responsibility for delivering the 
New Deals the ES has invested time and resources in redefining its approach in order to 
rebuild its credibility with the unemployed, employers and other agencies. This has involved 
the creation of a national network of local New Deal partnerships; the introduction of a new 
generation of front line employment advisers; contracting with a broad range of public, 
voluntary and private sector organisations for the delivery of new services and employment 
and training options; and changes to its performance targets which have started to encourage it 
to work with other agencies. DfEE has emphasised that “partnership is key to the success of 
the New Deal” (1999, p.126) and in its ‘Way Ahead’ the ES acknowledged that it would need 
to “maintain and further extend” this partnership approach as it engages with the hardest to 
place unemployed and previously ‘inactive’ benefit claimants (ES, 1999a, p.6).  
 
Recent developments in labour market policies have also ushered in an expansion of direct 
private sector involvement in the delivery of new services for the unemployed. Private sector 
                                                          
1 While the Welfare to Work strategy and New Deal programmes cover the whole UK, the ES and BA only cover 
GB, with different institutions responsible for delivering programmes and benefits in Northern Ireland. 
Devolution in Scotland and Wales also means that some differences in aspects of both delivery and institutional 
arrangements are likely to increase. 
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organisations, in varying combinations with the ES, are now responsible for delivering most 
Employment Zones, and in a number of areas are delivering the New Deals for the 
unemployed and the ‘One Service’. The Government maintains that this is not a prelude to 
privatisation but a variation of its partnership strategy where it is attempting to include the 
resources, expertise and innovative practices of the private sector in delivering the broad 
welfare to work agenda. 
 
This paper outlines the role and purpose of the ES and its relationship with its provider 
network and the private sector. It describes the ‘front line’ legacy that New Labour inherited 
and the ways in which the ES has ‘reinvented’ itself. It then assesses the progress of the New 
Deals and the role that local partnerships have played in delivering the programmes. Finally, it 
considers the capacity of the existing mixed economy of private, voluntary and public sector 
providers to deliver the Government’s ambitious agenda with a particular focus on the 
emergence of the ‘new intermediaries’ and the growing role of the private sector. 
 
The Employment Service 
 
The modern Employment Service was formed in 1987 bringing together the activities of the 
Job Centre network with the former Unemployment Benefit Service. Subsequently, in April 
1990, the ES became an Executive Agency and, following a departmental merger in 1995, it 
became accountable to the Secretary of State for Education and Employment. The Secretary of 
State defines the aims and objectives of the ES through a ‘Framework Document’ and sets out 
targets for the ES in an  Annual Performance Agreement. Currently the ES employs nearly 
32,000 staff and has a national network of nearly 1,100 Jobcentres. 
 
The role of the ES, its aims and objectives and the nature of its activities have changed 
significantly. From the mid-1980s labour market policy moved away from large scale, 
undifferentiated (‘one size fits all’) training and work experience programmes towards policies 
designed to ensure that those claiming unemployment benefits remain attached to the labour 
market and that the barriers which prevent individuals taking up jobs are removed. The 
integration of job broking, active labour market policies, mandatory remotivation courses and 
tighter benefit administration, effectively merged what had previously been separate ‘enabling’ 
and ‘benefit policing’roles.  
 
Four key trends characterised the policy environment that the ES worked within before the 
introduction of the New Deal. The first trend was the emphasis on reinforcing work incentives 
and maximising and monitoring the job seeking behaviour of the unemployed in the context of 
a deregulated labour market. This was underpinned by what the ES called the 'stricter benefit 
regime'. The second trend was the shift from more resource intensive active labour market 
programmes towards measures for immediate job preparation and job entry (the ‘work first’ 
approach). The third trend was a performance targets regime which was increasingly geared to 
immediate job entry, benefits policing and the imposition of sanctions. Finally, the ES was 
under constant pressure to reduce its operating costs and obtain better ‘value for money’.   
 
Over a ten year period the ES achieved its ‘efficiency savings’ through a combination of 
market testing, contracting out, cost reviews and other techniques such as business process re-
engineering (Fletcher, 1996, p.174). One consequence was that by 1996 the ES had withdrawn 
from most direct programme provision and, through its Regional Offices, contracted out its 
schemes via competitive tendering and performance related contracts to a diverse range of 
private providers, voluntary sector organisations, colleges, Local Authorities and religious 
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groups.  
 
A Mixed Legacy: Front Line Staff and Providers 
 
The ES has promoted itself as a high performance and high achievement agency, with a 
reputation for implementing new national initiatives to short timescales. Despite much 
controversy about the way it measured its job entry performance there is no doubt that the ES 
has made a significant contribution to reducing unemployment, especially long term 
unemployment, before (and since) the change of Government (ESC, vol. I, 1999, p. xi). 
 
However, despite this success, the new Government inherited significant problems, especially 
in the areas of highest unemployment, where there was considerable dissatisfaction amongst 
front line ES staff and widespread scepticism about ‘schemes’ amongst the unemployed, 
employers and providers. This legacy was most strongly expressed in the findings of the many 
official and independent ‘focus group’ research projects that accompanied the introduction of 
the New Deal (EPI, 1998; Finn et al, 1998; Bentley et al, 1999). 
 
One study, which involved depth interviews with over fifty ‘street level’ key workers in the ES 
and amongst their providers, found a strong overall sense that ES staff had a difficult job to do 
especially in urban areas of high unemployment but that it was made even more difficult 
through a lack of resources, compounded by persistent queues and in some cases by poor 
management (Finn et al, 1998). ES workers themselves were critical of high caseload and the 
target culture within which they worked, feeling that the pressures made it difficult for them to 
give individual support, could result in unsuitable submissions and in some cases led to 
“burnout”. It seemed that rigid targets for the number of people being referred to programmes 
distorted ES priorities, prevented them from delivering a fully client-centred service, and 
meant that too many people ended up in programmes unsuitable for their needs.  
 
According to all the key workers in these high unemployment areas high staff turnover and 
mobility in the ES was a major problem. It undermined the continuity of working 
relationships, both between the ES and the unemployed, and between the ES and provider 
organisations. At the ‘front line’ lack of experience led to problems including poor quality 
advice and guidance, clients being directed to programmes or premises that no longer existed, 
misinformation about the right to combine benefit with part-time study, and problems in giving 
unemployed people accurate advice about in-work benefits. These problems were exacerbated 
by the use of casual staff which was highest in these areas and had also increased, from a 
normal 7% of all ES staff to nearly 13% in 1996-97, as the ES coped with the demands of 
implementing the Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). Even though ES staff morale improved 
dramatically after the change of Government the 1997 Annual Staff Survey still found that 
only 37% thought the ES had well motivated staff and only 33% thought their office had 
sufficient staff to provide a satisfactory service. 
 
At ‘street level’ the relationships between the various organisations involved in the 
“unemployment industry” were complex. There were many examples of positive links between 
agencies and especially between key staff working for providers and in the ES. However, there 
were problems that worked against the interests of claimants. For example, competition 
between various providers meant that information was not always shared or communicated to 
clients. Competition for vacancies was also strong with many organisations seeking to develop 
exclusive relationships with prospective employers. There was also much “turbulence” and 
instability amongst the provider network. Small organisations suffered greatly from 
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fluctuations in demand and found it hard to compete for and deliver ES programmes. Larger 
organisations experienced considerable instability, owing to policy changes and budget 
reductions. This volatility in the market encouraged the employment of many front-line staff 
on short-term contracts, job changes were common and there was little incentive to invest in 
their skills. 
 
Despite the problems experienced by the ES provider network some of the organisations 
involved were part of a significant trend in the late 1980s and 1990s which had witnessed the 
development of a broad range of local and non-governmental organisations which had 
developed their own smaller-scale local training and employment initiatives. Many were 
supported by Local Authorities, by regeneration partnerships, by TECs and LECs, and by the 
European Commission. Juggling with complex funding regimes and often inflexible benefit 
regulations, organisations working with women and lone parents, with refugees, with ethnic 
minorities, with the homeless and with the young and long term unemployed, created new 
advice, information and training services, many of which appeared to secure impressive job 
entry and progression rates. According to one review (Turok and Webster, 1998, p.324): 
 
Many offer a wider range of support and better integrated provision, including 
independent guidance and counselling, personal development and vocational training 
in flexible packages, customised training for specific vacancies, work experience 
paying the rate for the job and providing transferable skills, complementary child 
care, intensive assistance with job-seeking, and progressive wage and training 
subsidies to private employers with some obligation to keep on recruits afterwards.  
 
The development of these smaller scale local projects reflected a growing change in 
perspective. By the mid-1990s it was not only recognised that long term unemployment and 
joblessness was concentrated in particular areas, but that different local approaches were 
necessary to respond to the needs of these “partially connected, differentiated, local labour 
markets” (Campbell et al, 1998, p. 2). However, although the last Conservative Government 
had, particularly through the SRB, begun to promote the development of local partnerships in 
areas of high unemployment there was no significant attempt to draw the ES into this new way 
of working. Institutionally, the ES maintained its independence and argued that it was “a 
national organisation delivering standard products and services in all parts of the country”. It 
saw no “scope for added value through separate product and service development in each 
region” (RPC, 1996, p.119). The consequence was that ES programmes had little local 
flexibility, and the service was driven by its nationally determined output targets. This 
reinforced the isolation of Jobcentres from many employment and regeneration initiatives, 
especially those funded through SRB and ESF. 
 
There was also no effort to create direct links between local partnerships and the activities of 
the Department of Social Security and its service delivery ‘Benefits Agency’ (with about 500 
local offices). The BA is responsible for the assessment and delivery of most benefits but so 
far it has had little apparent flexibility about how they might apply their rules in ways that are 
better integrated with local employment and training programmes. 
 
Delivering the New Deal: the Task Force, Local Partnerships and Contracts 
 
Within weeks of taking office the new Government gave the ES the lead responsibility for 
delivering the New Deal. However, they understood that the ES had a credibility problem and 
that it would be vital to involve employers and a broad range of other organisations in the 
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delivery of the programme to build capacity, ensure effective delivery and secure job 
outcomes.  
 
At national level a New Deal Task Force was established, with representation from major 
employers, trade unions and the public and voluntary sector. The Task Force has subsequently 
monitored implementation, given advice to Government, and sought to build employer 
involvement in the programme (for example, through the creation of Employer Coalitions in 
ten cities). It is supported by a broader Advisory Group with representation from TECs, the 
voluntary sector, FE colleges and so on. Parallel national advisory Task Forces have been 
established in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
 
At local level the New Deals for the unemployed are delivered through 144 ‘Units of 
Delivery’. Initially the relevant ES District Managers were encouraged to consult widely and 
to form local strategic partnerships to develop 'District Delivery Plans' (which are updated 
annually). In most areas it seems that early broad based consultation was followed by the 
creation of a narrower group of key strategic partners, usually involving Local Authorities, the 
TEC, Further Education Colleges and some employers. 
 
While some diversity was encouraged the flexibility that exists in the New Deal has mainly 
been in the delivery not the design of the programme. However, increased flexibility has been 
generated by local partnerships utilising other funding streams and by initiatives supported by 
a national innovation fund, and by 2000 an evaluation report found “growing evidence of 
differences in the New Deal  experience between areas” (Hasluck, 2000, p. vii). In terms of 
delivery, local areas were given a choice of three contracting models, although it was made 
clear that the actual award of contracts would be conducted through competitive tendering with 
final decisions being made by regional ES officials. By 1998 a wide variety of partnerships 
had emerged, ranging from Joint Venture Partnerships, where the ES shares contractual 
responsibility; through to ‘consortia’ where the ES contracts with one organisation which 
subsequently contracts with providers; through to more conventional arrangements where the 
ES controls individual contracts but works with an ‘advisory’ partnership. In ten delivery areas 
lead responsibility was removed from the ES and given to private sector organisations. 
 
The initial District Plans were assessed by Regional Assessment Panels, which had 
Government and external representation. Although there was much diversity in the plans DfEE 
identified some common attributes that were shared by the ‘best’. These included a rigorous 
analysis of the area which defined priorities and shaped the services and provision on offer; the 
active participation of key partners, at senior level; the commitment by business of resources 
and expertise, in addition to offers of vacancies; and genuine innovation in the Gateway and 
each of the four options.  Other positive features included the integration of the New Deal with 
existing job creation provision, and synergy with other funding streams, such as ESF. 
 
There were, however, significant weaknesses. There had been “confusion” about the 
contracting options and there was a “lack of innovation”, attributed to the short timescales 
imposed, and a lack of direct business involvement in the design of the plans, with most 
employer representation “limited to the TEC or Chamber of Commerce and perhaps one 
company”. The ES also acknowledged that the approach represented a significant challenge for 
staff and managers who had relatively little experience of managing partnerships and who 
were exposed to “much more open discussion about policy and delivery” and had to “very 
rapidly” develop “new skills of working with and influencing others” (ESC, vol. II, p. 188).  
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Evaluations of the first ‘pathfinder’ areas highlighted considerable success in putting complex 
partnership arrangements in place and reported strong local support for the New Deal (KPMG, 
1997; Tavistock, 1998). However, they also found evidence of emerging problems which 
characterised the national roll out of the programme. In some areas partnerships had not 
worked well, especially where the ES had only developed relatively weak external links. 
Another concern was described as “partnership fatigue”, where it was unclear how the New 
Deal for the young unemployed linked with a multiplicity of other local initiatives. There were 
also reservations about potential conflicts of interest and about the outcome of the contracting 
process. For one partner quoted there was a real danger that the partnership itself  “could seem 
like a ‘magic circle’ at the planning stage and a ‘cartel’ at the delivery stage, if contracts went 
to all of the same big players” (KPMG, 1997, p14).  
 
These criticisms were echoed in the findings of a Select Committee inquiry which, drawing on 
comprehensive evidence from the pathfinder areas, also reported the following concerns about 
the contracting process (1998, p. xviii): 
 
• the bureaucratic and protracted nature of the process had deterred smaller 
organisation; 
• large organisations accustomed to contracting with the ES - the ‘usual suspects’ - 
had won the majority of contracts; 
• small providers suffered from ‘call-off’ contracts, which required them to set up an 
infrastructure for delivery of services without any guarantee of client flows to offset 
fixed costs; 
• the effects of competitive tendering; and 
• the effects of tight timescales upon the preparation of innovative bids. 
 
Frustration had also been expressed at the division of responsibility between ES District and 
Regional Offices, with District Managers having to negotiate with partners whilst having “little 
autonomy” over their budgets and contracts (ibid, p.xix). There were also problems about the 
conflicting advice that providers could receive from different levels of the ES (UUY, 1999, 
p.8). 
 
The unwieldy nature of ES contracting processes owes much to auditing controversies which 
characterised the early 1990s, where some TEC providers manipulated output funding regimes, 
and where ES and TEC procedures were found wanting (NAO, 1995). It also reflected the 
need to be able to withstand any challenge in terms of fairness and propriety. However, the  
Select Committee called for a more flexible approach to contracts and competitive tendering 
which would reduce ‘red tape’ and help build the capacity and involvement of smaller 
providers especially from ethnic minority communities. By mid 1998 DfEE had established a 
‘fundamental review of the contracting process’, in consultation with ‘key partners’,  aimed at 
removing any unnecessary bureaucracy. This reviewed and updated New Deal model contracts 
and resulted in the publication of a new more ‘user friendly’ guide on contracting 
arrangements. Steps were also taken to reduce the amount of paperwork. The revised 
contracting process will be tested in the next year as providers bid to be able to deliver the 
New Deal for the young unemployed from April 2001. 
 
In terms of partnership working the most recent qualitative evaluation of the local New Deal 
Partnerships was based on case studies carried out between November 1998 and April 1999 
(Tavistock, 1999). This reported that the focus of the work of partnerships had shifted from 
strategy to delivery. They found that membership of the partnerships had changed little during 
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the first year or so, but many had been able to increase participation of ethnic minority, 
disability and trade union representatives. However, smaller and more specialist agencies 
continued to find it difficult to participate. Overall, the report suggested that actual partnership 
working was stronger in the JVP and Consortia models and weakest in the ES and Private 
Sector led areas. 
 
The actual performance of New Deal Units of Delivery, and by implication the local 
partnerships, is subject to several forms of scrutiny. The most significant is the regular 
publication of performance data, especially on job entry, which (for the first time for the ES) 
has been disaggregated so that inter-area comparisons can be made. To ensure that 
comparisons are comparing ‘like with like’ Units of Delivery are ‘clustered’ into seven 
categories ranging from ‘rural tight labour market’ through to ‘inner city high unemployment’.  
These performance tables have revealed significant variations in achievements within the 
clusters and Government has used the information to try tp drive up the performance of ‘failing 
partnerships’ (see next section).  
 
A significant new dimension of scrutiny is coming through the work of the Training Standards 
Council (TSC), which published its first eleven reports on New Deal Units of Delivery in 2000 
(www.tsc.gov.uk). The TSC require those inspected to prepare an initial self-assessment which 
enables them to subsequently assess the degree of management's awareness of any 
shortcomings that the inspectors identify. The inspection format is focused closely on raising 
skills and the education and training elements of all four options receive the closest attention, 
followed by general management, support and advice for young people and equal opportunities 
issues. There was little scrutiny of employment outcomes.  
 
The first reports highlighted some good examples of the way that New Deal is making a 
positive contribution towards helping disadvantaged young people gain a foothold in the jobs 
market. The TSC were impressed with the high levels of commitment demonstrated by ES 
staff and by employers. They also found some extremely good examples of partnership 
working and the application of equal opportunities good practice. However, there were more 
cases where a below average grading was given than an above average grading. The New Deal 
Units are given the reports before publication and are expected to use the findings to remedy 
the problems identified. 
 
Overall, the ES recognises the “need to continue developing and improving .. its relationships 
between partners at all levels” and it continues to build the capacity of the local partnerships 
through disseminating good practice and through working with a network of national partners 
to support local partnerships, for example in building ethnic minority and trade union 
representation (ES, 1999b, p.36). The Government has also made clear that the local New Deal 
partnerships are likely to play a significant role in the design, delivery and future development 
of the welfare to work strategy, and they are already involved in the extension of the New Deal 
approach to the older unemployed.  
 
New Deal Outcomes: Continuous Improvement and the Job Entry Performance of 
Partnerships and Option Providers 
 
In combination with strong labour demand UK unemployment has fallen sharply and the New 
Deals are enabling more of the long term unemployed to compete for vacancies. Morale in the 
ES has improved markedly and it seems that the young people in particular have responded 
positively to the new approach (see, for example, Legard and Ritchie, 1999).  By April 1999, 
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the end of the first full year, partnerships had been established and new and imaginative design 
elements had been implemented, including the Gateway, Personal Advisers and the variety of 
options. In the first year over 105,000 young people had gone into jobs, mostly unsubsidised, 
and over 50,000 employers had entered agreements saying they would recruit through the 
programme.  
 
However, during the year significant issues emerged and the progress of the New Deals was 
punctuated by controversies about the degree of local flexibility; about the award and nature of 
provider contracts; about the involvement and performance of private sector agencies; about 
the numbers of those called to interviews or referred to options who “disappeared”; and about 
the speed with which young unemployed people were assessed and prepared in the Gateway. 
Significant variations in the job entry performance of areas and options emerged and young 
ethnic minority people were less likely to get jobs. There was also concern about job retention 
where just over one in five of those who entered unsubsidised jobs were back on JSA six 
months later (NDRTF, 1999, p. 13). 
 
The Government responded with a variety of initiatives. Amongst other things these included 
the development of new diagnostic tools, resources to intensify the Gateway, increased 
sanctions and the creation of a new ‘innovation fund’. These initiatives were part of what 
became the ‘Continuous Improvement Strategy’. In June 1999 the most fundamental and 
challenging element of this strategy was to set all New Deal Units of Delivery the target of 
increasing their job entry rates by mid 2000 by at least 6% and to secure parity of outcomes for 
ethnic minority young people by the end of the Parliament. 
 
By the end of January 2000 191,600 young people had found jobs through the New Deal, 
although 51,600 had left those jobs in under 13 weeks.2 The Government is likely to meet its 
manifesto target of 250,000 into jobs by October 2000, or by July 2001 if  it only counts 
‘sustained’ jobs.  
 
Although national performance is in excess of meeting the 6% improvement target, it has 
become clear that some partnerships are struggling to keep up and the overall job entry 
performance of the options is still weak. Amongst local Units of Delivery 82 were meeting or 
exceeding the 6% target but the gap between the good and poor performers was widening, 
especially in those areas classified as ‘high unemployment inner cities’ where only 3 out of 18 
were on target. Amongst more general measures the ES is now implementing a strategy to try 
to drive up performance in these areas, although there is no clear indication about what steps 
will be taken if progress is not forthcoming. One key element of the strategy is to stimulate the 
inner city development of what have been described as new intermediary organisations who 
are expected to secure better job outcomes. 
 
The new intermediaries are also expected to play a role in improving the performance of the 
options. Currently only 12% of those leaving the options are going directly into jobs, although 
the proportion increases to 27% if those who found work after the ‘follow through’ are 
included. Yet some providers secure far better outcomes with, for example, some full time 
                                                          
2 This paper only considers in detail the performance of the New Deal for the young unemployed. The New Deal 
for the older unemployed was implemented later and is less resource intensive and its job entry rates have been 
modest. However, in the 2000 Budget the Government announced that something like the New Deal for the 
young will be extended to those aged over 25 who have been out of work for over 18 months from April 2001. 
This is likely to intensify the demands being made on local partnerships and the providers who will contract to 
work with this more difficult to place group.  
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education and training providers able to get half of their leavers into jobs compared with an 
average of only 10%. One immediate response is that ES Regions are reviewing the 
performance of providers and either cancelling contracts or putting providers on notice about 
their poor performance. Other providers are being encouraged to focus more directly on job 
entry and develop stronger links with their local labour markets. 
 
Delivering the New Deal: the Role of Intermediaries 
 
For many private, public and voluntary sector organisations involvement in delivering 
employment and training programmes has proved a mixed blessing. Over the past 15 years 
many organisations had withdrawn from participation and others have found it increasingly 
difficult to cope with the ‘boom and bust’ funding cycles associated with abrupt changes in 
programmes, targets and funding regimes. One result is that the sector has been characterised 
by instability both for those organising premises, staff training, and so on, and for those 
working directly with the unemployed. This has undermined the capacity of these 
organisations to build durable relationships with other providers and with employers, 
especially in the areas of highest unemployment. 
 
The change of Government and the creation of the New Deal helped reverse some of these 
trends and commercial providers, voluntary agencies and community based organisations have 
come forward in large numbers both to directly provide specialist services and the options and 
to provide placement opportunities for schemes run by other providers. The successful New 
Deal providers have become (or were already) part of a large mixed economy of private, public 
and voluntary sector organisations delivering a complex array of employment and training 
programmes through a myriad number of sub contractors and placement providers. Although 
quality assurance thresholds and standards are required through the contracting process, and 
‘policed’ by the ES and various inspectorates, remarkably little is known about the 
organisations that make up the ‘unemployment industry’ or the staff who work for them.  
 
Because of the low job entry rates of the New Deal option providers policy attention has now 
shifted to the capacity of these organisations, especially in inner city areas where employer 
based programmes are more difficult to operate. It is accepted that part of the explanation is 
that option providers, almost by definition, are working with more disadvantaged young 
people, but it is also suggested that the low placement rates of many of the organisations 
involved are also the product of weak employer links. 
 
In this context the New Deal Task Force, with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
commissioned a research paper which was to identify best practice from successful employer-
led welfare to work programmes in the USA (JFF, 1999). This reported that one thing which 
characterised the programmes of companies as diverse as American Airlines, Pizza Hut, Xerox 
Business Services and the United Parcel Services, was the close relations they had developed 
with 'intermediary' organisations. The key characteristic of these ‘new intermediaries’ was that 
they were both employer/demand led and client focussed. The Task Force, again with the 
support of the Rockefeller Foundation, commissioned more in-depth research into 
intermediaries in both the US and UK, and followed this up with a two day conference in mid-
1999. This has resulted in a major policy drive to extend the intermediary approach throughout 
the delivery of the Government’s welfare to work programmes. 
 
The intermediary development work identified a mix of services, organisational capacity, staff 
skills, relationships and commitments that have made some organisations more successful than 
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others both in meeting employers needs and in enabling disadvantaged job seekers enter the 
labour market. Although the ‘new intermediaries’ are at an early stage of development the 
research reports highlighted a number of ‘ideal type’ characteristics that distinguish them from 
traditional programme providers and job brokers (NDTFI, 1999, p.3): 
 
• Intermediaries can be found in all sectors - public, private and voluntary - but they  
are essentially local organisations (usually ‘not for profit’) with an intimate knowledge 
of the employers which they serve and the communities in which they operate.  
• Intermediaries are playing broader and more diverse roles within the local labour 
market. They are serving not only as job brokers but as active agents on both sides of 
the market. In this capacity, they provide customised training and support for 
individuals to meet employer specifications; at the same time, they help companies 
(and clusters of firms) to assess and articulate their needs, improve recruitment and 
training, and support workforce development.  
•  Intermediaries are able to integrate detailed information about vacancies, skill 
shortages, individual employers, job seeker characteristics and the services available 
through public and community resources. They use this information to develop and 
manage flexible packages of services for their dual customers. In doing so, they also act 
as a buffer between the needs of employers and unemployed people, and the 
complexities of programme regulations and funding. 
• Intermediaries provide services (for both the employer and individual) to increase 
job retention and progression as the most effective route out of poverty.  
• They are able to build effective partnerships and know how to network. This is vital 
as few of them have the capacity to maintain a full portfolio of services and they rely 
on close relationships with local agencies which provide specialised support in such 
areas as housing, transportation, substance abuse, child care, and so on.  
 
The conclusions drawn from the development work around intermediaries are significant. 
From an initial focus which saw them as interesting niche organisations, those working with 
the Task Force now view the new intermediaries as offering a fundamentally new approach. 
The challenge is not to simply develop the competence of existing providers but “to transform 
the culture and capacity of organisations throughout the employment and training system - to 
imbue them with the values and attributes of effective intermediaries” (NDTFI, 1999, p.1). 
 
There is no simple way in which this transformation can take place and it is suggested that the 
Government will have to play an enabling role - “to establish a framework that preserves 
public accountability without diminishing innovation, speed or specialisation” -  and that it 
will take “sustained investment” over the next five to ten years to develop intermediaries as a 
significant part of the employment and training delivery system. 
 
The Government has responded through the New Deal Innovation Fund and has allocated 
£10m over the next three years to support proposals which will test demand-led strategies 
sponsored by intermediaries from the public, private and voluntary sectors. The fund is divided 
in two parts: half is for community based initiatives in eleven inner city areas (which are 
covered by Employer Coalitions), and half is for projects linking New Deal participants to 
particular sectors, initially financial services and IT. Bids are being invited from new and 
existing organisations, over two bidding rounds in April and October 2000.  
  
As an initial step, a workshop was held at No. 11 Downing Street in late 1999 which brought 
together business leaders, and voluntary and community groups, to explore and discuss how 
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intermediaries might support disadvantaged unemployed people from London to find and keep 
financial-sector jobs in the City. Since then, ten major financial companies have agreed to 
review their human resource requirements and the vacancies which New Deal participants 
could be trained for, support the development of intermediaries in order to meet the sector's 
requirements, and contribute towards the cost of the project. It is planned to hold an equivalent 
workshop and develop a similar approach for the IT sector. 
 
A key component in the ‘intermediaries strategy’ is the 18 month partnership agreement that 
the New Deal Task Force has entered into with the New York based Wildcat Service 
Corporation.3 The aim is both to provide technical assistance and training to the ES and 
community based organisations in developing demand-led strategies, beginning with financial 
and IT services, and to help identify policy and programme design issues which must be 
addressed if intermediaries “are to successfully implement demand-led strategies and achieve 
rigorous performance objectives”. The policy implications of this activity will be drawn 
together through a Task Force ‘Intermediaries Advisory Group’ which has also been asked to 
help “clarify” the relationship 
between the ES and intermediaries within the context of welfare to work and workforce 
development systems. 
 
Delivering the New Deal: the Employment Service and Private Employment Agencies 
 
In addition to general partnership working and the involvement of private organisations as 
programme subcontractors or intermediaries, the Government’s commitment to using public 
private partnerships has had two other direct and significant impacts on the delivery of its 
welfare to work strategy. First, private sector organisations, in varying combinations with the 
ES, have in a number of areas been given contracts to deliver the New Deals for the 
unemployed, the ‘One’ Service, and Employment Zones. The main contractors have been 
private employment agencies, especially ‘Reed in Partnership’ and Manpower (the UK 
subsidiary of  one of the largest recruitment businesses in the world). Second, the ES has been 
asked to modernise its ‘job broking’ relationship with private recruitment agencies in ways that 
will increase the number of job vacancies available to unemployed people (see ‘Appendix A’ 
for a more detailed description of the recruitment agency industry and the role it plays in the 
job search strategies of the unemployed). 
 
The highest profile and longest standing involvement of the private sector has been in the New 
Deal for the young unemployed where, in ten areas, private contractors organise and lead 
delivery (see Table 1). The areas reflect a range of different labour markets and the nature of 
private sector involvement varies. For example, in six areas the private sector is responsible for 
delivering the Gateway and all the options, whereas in two areas the private sector organisation 
receives a management fee to coordinate delivery. Manpower, which manages Bridgend, 
suggests that its approach is the only “true partnership with the ES”. In particular by working 
through Jobcentres and ES Personal Advisers, operating within ES policy frameworks and 
acting as part of a joint management team, Manpower is developing delivery techniques which 
are readily transferable to other ES led districts. 
 
Table 1: New Deal for the Young Unemployed: Private Sector Led Area 
                                                          
3 In its research on US organisations the Task Force identified Wildcat Service Corporation as an intermediary 
that is nationally recognised for its success in moving welfare recipients into well-paid jobs with very high 
retention rates. Wildcat had also had extensive experience in assisting other community organisations to develop 
demand-led strategies. 
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Unit of Delivery   Private Sector Organisation 
 
Bridgend & Glamorgan Valleys Manpower Ltd. 
Exeter & East Devon   Action for Employment Ltd. 
Forth Valley    Triage Central 
Hackney & City    Reed W2W Ltd. 
Leicestershire    Fernly Business Services Ltd. 
North Essex    MARI Group Ltd. 
Solihull     Action for Employment Ltd. 
South Humber    Capita Business Services 
Tyneside North    Seetec 
West Lancashire   Training West Lancashire Ltd. (formerly TP Training) 
 
The actual funding mechanism in each private sector area varies and was negotiated separately 
but they each normally contain (ESC, vol II, 1999, p.249): 
  
• an ‘all inclusive’ price, which is paid for each client to cover the full period of time 
on New Deal. This allows the private sector provider to use the funds flexibly across all 
clients - on the basis that some clients will need more help than others; 
• a monthly ‘management fee’ with further elements paid on achievement of specified 
levels of performance; and 
• an agreed amount payable for each client as they enter particular elements of New 
Deal. 
 
The trigger points also differ. Some private sector providers have payment arrangements 
linked to all clients identified as eligible for the ND, while others are paid when the client has 
their first Gateway interview. The amount available to each private provider differs, depending 
on the balance of delivery between ES and the private sector provider. However, the overall 
level of funding was based upon the standard level of funding available to ES led Units of 
Delivery (£1,736 per client, excluding allowances). The key point is that the greater the 
success that the private sector organisation has in moving clients quickly through the process 
and into jobs, the greater the profit they can secure and/or the greater funds they have to divert 
to those clients who are harder to help. 
 
Initially, the private sector led areas experienced start up problems both with managing the 
programme, their relationship with ES staff, and in working with unemployed people they had 
little experience of. This was particularly the case in Hackney, where Reed in Partnership, 
appeared to perform poorly. Overall, however, their performance has improved and the latest 
data on entry into work at 46% compares well with the 41% achieved by other New Deal areas 
(the difference reflects differences in local labour markets and in the number of clients moving 
into ‘unknown destinations’). Seven out of the ten areas are meeting or exceeding the target for 
improving their job outcomes by 6%. However, as with other New Deal areas some over 
perform relative to other areas of a similar type, others (such as Hackney or Solihull) under 
perform.  
 
The ES is currently undertaking an evaluation of the private sector led areas but the first 
detailed public scrutiny of one area, Leicestershire, has been published by the Training 
Standards Council. Considering that the contractor is a training provider, the inspection report 
on the training provided was poor, with weaknesses identified relating to poor achievement of 
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qualifications, poor retention in the Full Time Education and Training (FTET) option, poor 
monitoring and review process, poor use of individual training and action plans, and 
ineffective monitoring of the quality of training. In addition, there was a weakness in the 
failure to monitor equal opportunity activity at subcontractor level. There were also strengths, 
especially in the self employment route. Training provision in the FTET option was also 
effectively provided on a rolling basis, in contrast to other ES led areas where a heavy reliance 
on FE Colleges, combined with a low level of partnership working, had led to young people 
being directed onto inappropriate options simply because courses were not starting at the time. 
  
Detailed unpublished evidence shows that one of the significant differences between private 
sector and ES led areas is in the use of options. In private sector areas only 36% of those 
leaving the ‘gateway’ entered options, compared with 42% in the other areas. Private sector led 
areas also seem to make much greater use of the voluntary and environmental sector option 
and less of the subsidised employment option. This may reflect the nature of the area, but 
could be a function of the funding model. Most significantly it seems that the National Audit 
Office has expressed concern about some of the detailed terms of the private sector contracts. 
In most areas the greater use of the Gateway and the larger than expected movement into 
unsubsidised jobs resulted in proportionate decreases in their unit costs. However, in the 
private sector areas actual unit costs were agreed in advance and because the entry into options 
was lower than that planned this has produced a greater level of profit than anticipated.  
 
Although this particular issue will be tackled in the re-contracting for April 2001 it does 
highlight the problems of accountability and of ensuring value for money from public funds. 
Indeed, these concerns have also been expressed about the  funding mechanism agreed for the 
new Employment Zones. The principal concern is not just that improvements in job entry and 
retention rates will generate greater profits, but that providers will focus on those who are most 
easy to place and that others may be ‘parked’ in lower cost, less intensive provision. DfEE and 
the contractors argue that because of the ‘risk’ involved in the contracts this is unlikely to 
happen, but these issues have bedevilled performance related funding regimes and have been 
particularly acute in the privatised Australian employment placement market (ref). 
 
In terms of more general ‘job broking’ activity there has been a long standing relationship 
between the ES and the recruitment industry about safeguards and how its vacancies should be 
handled at Jobcentres. The ES is trying to extend cooperation and joint work between agencies 
and Jobcentres and has recently developed a digest of good practice with the main industry 
body, now called the ‘Recruitment and Employment Confederation’ (REC). The ES is also 
actively exploring ways of including agency job vacancies on a new ‘Internet Job Bank’ which 
the ES plans to open in 2001. The ES Chief Executive has suggested that the relationship 
works well and that up to 15% of all vacancies carried by the ES now come from agencies 
(ESC, 1999, vol 1, p.xx). However, it is not known how many unemployed people take these 
jobs and, on taking more detailed evidence, a Select Committee was told that in some areas 
“an atmosphere of competition prevailed” and that “the degree of partnership” at local level is 
“a function of how the agreement is interpreted locally and the relationship between the 
various participants” (ibid, p. xx).  
 
It should also be noted that competitive tensions between the agency industry and the ES could 
increase as the ES moves to increase the quantity and quality of vacancies available to its 
clients; develop job retention services for those it places in work; and improve its services for 
employers. Although both the ES and the agency industry suggest that their activities now 
complement rather than compete with each other, in the early 1980s the situation was very 
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different and the agency industry played a key role in lobbying the then Government to reverse 
the strategy of the ES which at that time was to increase its share of the vacancy market. 
 
Conclusion 
  
The Government has been able to cultivate broad-based support, especially for its New Deal 
programmes, at least partly by engaging directly with the private, voluntary and public sectors, 
both as partners and providers. There is now considerable evidence that these ‘public private 
partnerships’ have generated considerable innovation, flexibility and created real synergy 
between the New Deals and other programmes and funding streams. However, there is also 
evidence that the new implementation architecture is under considerable pressure, and this is 
likely to grow as the Government rolls out its other New Deal programmes. In the areas of 
greatest need the caseloads of New Deal Personal Advisers are increasing and they are having 
to engage with more disadvantaged and disaffected young people. The extensive provider 
network, with its myriad sub-contractors, is also struggling to deliver the high job entry rates 
that are vital if the New Deals are to break free from the widely held public perception that 
these programmes are yet more ‘schemes’ designed to massage the unemployment figures and 
pressurise the unemployed into taking whatever jobs are available. 
 
Ironically, as unemployment has fallen and as the ES has begun to assist the groups at most 
distance from the labour market, the New Deal is encountering barriers and revealing 
weaknesses in other services which, unless tackled, limit the potential for individuals to both 
take and retain jobs. For example, advisers often find that necessary and appropriate services 
do not exist in localities. Public transportation systems frequently cannot get people from their 
homes to the places where there are jobs. Childcare may not be available, or may not be 
available during non-traditional hours or when children are sick. Few substance abuse or 
rehabilitation programmes have a strong employment focus. Work based training opportunities 
for low wage entry-level workers are limited. One of the most important implementation 
challenges for the New Deal is to use the partnership approach to build on the links with 
workforce development, transportation, housing, economic development, and other systems 
that are only now starting to emerge. In addition to ‘growing’ a new generation of 
intermediaries, it is also vital to build the capacity of the existing provider network and to 
strengthen the links it has with employers. 
 
Finally, the evolving relationship between the ES and the private sector is at a critical juncture. 
Are the new partnership arrangements simply a welcome modernisation adding value by 
drawing in new skills and expertise and broadening the base of vacancies available to the 
unemployed? Or are they, as some critics suggest, a prelude to a more radical form of 
privatisation, as implemented in the privatised employment placement markets created in 
Australia and the Netherlands and as now advocated by the Conservatives in their ‘Common 
Sense Revolution’? Unless firmly rebutted the threat of ‘creeping privatisation’ may 
undermine the partnership approach and could demotivate front line ES advisers whose 
continued commitment and performance are vital in enabling people to move from welfare into 
work. 
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Appendix A: Private Employment Agencies  
 
Although the employment agency industry is a central part of the UK labour market there has 
been little evaluation of the role these agencies play as bridges or barriers into jobs, as sources 
of jobs for the unemployed, or as providers of Government employment and training 
initiatives. 
 
Formally, the ES can advice unemployed people to register with employment agencies, and 
individual’s can be expected to register with one or more as part of their Jobseekers 
Agreement. A major survey into the impact of the Jobseeker’s Allowance, which interviewed 
samples of 5,000 registered unemployed people both before and after its implementation, 
found evidence that this had made some impact. It reported that the proportion of those who 
used private employment agencies had increased from 13% to 17% (McKay, et al, 1999, 
Figure 6.1). There was no data on how many obtained jobs through this route. However, LFS 
data from Spring 1998 shows that 10% of those individuals who were unemployed before they 
had obtained their job in the previous three months had done so through an agency. Nearly one 
in four (23%) of the ILO unemployed were registered with a private employment agency, 
though few (3%) relied on it as their main method of search. 
 
Currently there are about 10,000 private employment agencies in the UK, operating from some 
17,000 offices, directly employing about 63,000 staff  (DTI, 1999, p.3). Each week about 
500,000 job seekers find employment through the agencies and between 1994/95 and 1996/97 
the number of people they placed into permanent jobs increased from 258,000 to 445,480 and 
the number placed into temporary jobs increased from 754,000 to just over one million (FRES, 
1997, p.10). By late 1998 the then  Secretary of State for Trade and Industry was 
acknowledging that the industry had “tripled in size since 1992”. 
 
This growth has been fuelled by changes in employer recruitment practices. In 1996 the 
Institute of Employment Studies found that more than half the employers they surveyed used 
temporary workers, and the majority of those employers recruited their temporary staff through 
employment agencies (Atkinson, Rick, Morris and Williams, 1996). The Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey found that 75% of the largest workplaces report using ‘temps’, 
mainly recruited through agencies, and many employers report that they often use this 
experience as a form of ‘probation’ for permanent work. The greatest increases in the use of 
‘temps’ has been recorded in public administration, social care, health, banking and business 
services; with noticeable increases amongst white collar and clerical staff. However, there is 
evidence that recruitment agencies are playing a growing role in manual and casualised labour 
markets (Hansard, 1998). 
 
The industry is characterised by fierce competition, low entry requirements and high turnover, 
and a new regulatory framework has recently been agreed by Government (DTI, 1999). The 
largest agencies, especially Manpower, have welcomed steps which make it harder for 
‘cowboy’ operators and the Institute of Employment Consultants (now part of the 
‘Recruitment and Employment Confederation’) has done considerable work to establish 
recognised qualifications and to provide training in recruitment practice. However,  “it is still 
the case that only a small proportion of those working in the sector hold qualifications” (DTI, 
1999, p.13). 
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